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The United States Senate

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Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Wednesday, November 12, 1975

Washington, D. C.

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to the Committee for destruction)

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Statement of:
Bronson Tweedy

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STAFF INTERVIEW

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Wednesday, November 12, 1975

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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Staff met, pursuant to notice, at 10:50 o'clock a.m.,
in Room 610, Capitol Hill Hotel.

Present: Susan Pitts and Elliot Maxwell, Professional
Staff Members.

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STATEMENT OF BRONSON TWEEDY

Ms. Pitts. Would you please state your name and address for the record?

Mr. Tweedy. Bronson Tweedy, 6412 Garnett Drive, Chevy Chase, Maryland, 20015.

Ms. Pitts. Starting as early as 1959 apparently the first related mission directive for a Leopoldville station was written, And the jurisdiction of the station covered a lot more territory than just what was known as the Belgian Congo. And I am wondering if you remember at what point the jurisdiction of Leopoldville Station became restricted?

Mr. Tweedy. I think probably basically as we got coverage in the other areas, I imagine Brazzaville, probably, which was of course the French Congo, was in that. We probably had a sort of a watching brief for Angola, but it really didn't go much beyond that in those days. We may have had a watching brief for the Central African Republic, but I can assure you the Central African Republic was very little more than a geographical expression then.

We already had people, as I remember, in Salisbury. And it certainly didn't cover South Africa. I imagine that is all it covered. It may have covered Cameroons.

Ms. Pitts. And it covered Luanda?

Mr. Tweedy. Luanda, of course, is Angola. Yes. But I think that is it.

1 (Off the record discussion.)

2 Mr. Tweedy. To complete the answer, that is there sort of
3 for the record, but no one really expected the Chief of Station
4 in Leopoldville would really be able as a practical matter to
5 do very much about the other areas, nor at that stage was it
6 really that important. But this was sort of an administrative
7 device to try to keep the continent covered, is all.

8 Ms. Pitts. So the related mission directive which was a
9 directive which concentrated on intelligence collection and
10 trying to develop a field for if there was Communist influence
11 and that kind of thing would have just been a very general
12 kind of direction, wouldn't it?

13 Mr. Tweedy. What we were doing at that point is, we
14 were developing our knowledge of Africa in the first instance.
15 The Agency's representation in sub-Sahara and Africa had been
16 very limited. And for the first time we, and I as the
17 Division Chief, was faced with the problem of building a
18 division, staffing as many stations as seemed sensible, and
19 getting our feet on the ground in Africa, learning how to
20 operate in Africa. And those aspects obviously had to be
21 stated in terms of targets and priorities and the rest of it.
22 If you want to look back on it realistically, what in effect
23 we were saying was, get yourself at home in Africa and then
24 come back here.

25 Combe back in about a year and tell us where you are.

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1 and that is what we did. In about a year we began to have
2 a feel for the area. And in the process we were reporting.
3 And a lot of the reporting was the sort of thing which was
4 giving us background. It wasn't that the President was
5 hanging on our every word. That really wasn't the state of the
6 art. But we had to learn what it was all about, how the
7 Africans ran their own affairs, what were they like. One
8 thing you couldn't do was generalize about Africa. If you were
9 in Kenya it was Kenya, and in Angola, it was Angola, and never
10 the twain shall meet. Those were the things we had to learn,
11 and we could only learn by doing it the hard way.

12 Ms. Pitts. In the 1950s Mr. Bissell has said that the
13 emphasis on intelligence collection shifted from the Eastern
14 European bloc to third world countries because the ability to
15 collect intelligence was very limited in those areas, and it
16 was easier to combat Communism or collect information on
17 Communist influence in areas where Communism may just be
18 starting. And he made this general comment about the shifting
19 emphasis in the CIA's collection. Would you say that is fair?

20 Mr. Tweedy. I think that is fair.

21 Ms. Pitts. I am wondering how that might have been
22 translated into something like the creation of the African
23 Division in 1959?

24 Mr. Tweedy. The things that created the African Division
25 of course was the creation of modern Africa. That is what

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1 really created the African Division. Because other than that
2 it was a series of colonial estates.

3 Ms. Pitts. And our relation would have been restricted
4 to things like liaison and so on?

5 Mr. Tweedy. Very much so, exactly. But starting around
6 about 1959 for the next couple of years Africa exploded into
7 independence. In the National Geographic they gave up the
8 struggle about halfway and didn't print a map for about eight
9 months until things sort of settled down. And this was what
10 caused the African Division to be formed.

11 Ms. Pitts. A lot of that is given to President Kennedy's
12 interest in Africa, and Africa as a campaign issue in the
13 Kennedy campaign before his election in 1960?

14 Mr. Tweedy. Let's face it, the whole of the US was seized
15 and intrigued by this African explosion.

16 Ms. Pitts. It seems as if the interest would have
17 increased without Kennedy to me.

18 Mr. Tweedy. It would have increased without Kennedy. I
19 think also Kennedy, and a lot of other people, wrongly, I
20 think in the end, tied this to the black population of the
21 US and the interest they would have in this -- which in fact
22 was minimal. But that took a long time to really recognize.
23 I think the general feeling was that there would be a subject
24 of insistence on the part of the black population in the US
25 that the US, in quotes, do something about Africa. It just

1 didn't eventuate.

2 Ms. Pitts. By the same token, in terms of the US having
3 to do something about Africa, it seems as though another trend
4 that was influencing policy-makers as a group was the trend
5 of non-intervention in African, in that domestic black popula-
6 tion of the US would be outraged if we didn't do something.
7 Do you think if we intervened that would have carried weight?

8 Mr. Tweedy. If what you mean by intervene is try to run
9 the African affairs, then I think I would agree. But the
10 other aspect of this was, of course, in the early days, the
11 fear that the bloc, Soviet bloc, would gain some kind of
12 control over Africa. Now, in the end a lot of this proved
13 erroneous. But there was no way in the world you could prove
14 that in 1959. It was felt, I think, that those young,
15 unsophisticated African States would be sort of sitting ducks.
16 They didn't prove to be. But again it was a number of years
17 before the series of events occurred which indicated that the
18 Africans in their own funny way had a way of preserving their
19 own independence -- perhaps that is the wrong word -- but their
20 own way of doing things. And they could be just as mercurial
21 as the next man. But the experience in the Soviet Union had
22 with Sekou Toure in Guinea, it was like a yo-yo, they were
23 up one minute and down the next, and they never knew from
24 one minute to the next how they were going to be treated. But
25 there was no way in the world that the US could predict this.

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1 And thus the Kennedy Administration's interest in Africa was
2 certainly predicated partly on that political thing, the
3 blacks and the black continent, but also very much the fear of
4 the Soviet influence and the strategic leverage on the world
5 that would give them if it really went down the drain as it
6 were. And this of course was certainly a major interest --
7 a combination of both those things was the major influence
8 in our involvement in the Congo.

9 Ms. Pitts. Was the Congo particularly of strategic interest?

10 Mr. Tweedy. The Congo was the largest geographical
11 expression in the whole sub-Sahara and Africa.

12 Ms. Pitts. How much merit would you give to the argument
13 as entertained by some historians, and so on, that the Congo
14 as a supplier of uranium was of unique strategic importance?

15 Mr. Tweedy. This was an aspect. And again not so much
16 the uranium supply was very important to the US then, I guess
17 there are many other sources of it now, for awhile of course
18 it was the only source, during the war. Copper was very
19 important, not that the US didn't have access to copper, but
20 they did not want some hostile power to have total and free
21 access to this enormous residual supply. So this was a factor
22 too. But I think the most important factor was that if the
23 Congo was going to fragment, the ripple effect in the balance
24 of sub-Sahara and Africa was unpredictable, but likely to
25 be very harmful. After all, a neighboring country was Nigeria.

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1 And in those days an enormous amount of hope reposed in the
2 orderly development of Nigeria. And it was felt that in the
3 Congo had gone down the drain the infection might easily
4 spread to Nigeria. And a lot of other developing countries.

5 And when Tsombe started to lead Katangan secession,
6 nothing became more apparent than the fact that the Congo
7 without Katanga was like constructing a cadillac without a
8 gas tank.

9 Ms. Pitts. How about the view that it would have truly
10 served US interests for Katanga to have ceded and to have
11 been under Western influence because of Tsombe --

12 Mr. Tweedy. We didn't believe it, believed that it
13 should belong to the Congo. And we also felt that the
14 effect of cutting Katanga off from Leopoldville would not
15 only have set an example, but it would have a palpable
16 effect on the rest of the world which would have been very
17 difficult for the democracies to answer. As I remember it
18 -- this was nothing of a factor in any discussions I held,
19 it may very well have been in the policy areas.

20 Ms. Pitts. What interests me about that aspect is that it
21 seems that our relationship with Belgium was very important
22 in terms of the courses of action that the US took in the
23 Congo, and respecting the long term relationship with Belgium.
24 And it would seem that if they had been most interested in
25 respecting that relationship they would have favored the

secession of Katanga. But obviously there were other factors that --

Mr. Tweedy. There were other factors very much more important. I think we would have been glad to see the Belgians able to maintain a sufficient control, administrative control over the mining industry in Katanga, so that it continued to be efficiently run. But I don't think the US Government felt it owed anything particularly to the Belgian Government to see to it that they maintained their hold there at all. Let's face it, the long term relations between Belgium and the US are important, but they are not overriding.

Ms. Pitts. In terms of the relationship of political and military instability in Africa as in Communism, the increase of Communist influence in Africa, do you think if there was an automatic assumption that any political instability was unfavorable -- what I am getting at is, if there hadn't been evidence, for instance, that had been receiving arms through the UAR from the USSR and that kind of thing, do you think that the US would have taken a stand of supporting Mobutu and the Central Government generally?

Mr. Tweedy. I think probably for the simple reason that we had Gizenga identified probably rightly as a radical racist African, bitterly anti-white. And we didn't believe at that point this was the kind of development in Africa that offered much solution for Africa's early days of

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1 independence. The role of the UAR and the USSR merely put
2 icing on that cake, there is no question but that it did. But
3 in the first instance I think the worry of the US Government
4 was over the possible political dissolution of the Congo for
5 African reasons, and superimposed on that came the business
6 of what the bloc would be likely to do, or what role they were
7 playing, and so on and so forth. In the first instance it
8 looked like it was going to fragment Africans. By that
9 I mean, Gizenga not so much as a Soviet pupil, but Gizenga
10 and Lumumba were early developments in the Congo independence
11 which were more likely to produce chaos, which was the last
12 thing one thought they needed, rather than at least a somewhat
13 orderly development.

14 Ms. Pitts. What prompts my question is that today, in
15 1975, the CIA justifies its action that it took on behalf of
16 the US Government on the basis of the Soviet threat in the
17 Congo.

18 Mr. Tweedy. All I am telling you is that it is a bit of
19 both. The Soviet threat certainly became more and more a part
20 of the general cold war worry. And of course the Soviets
21 themselves became more and more fascinated by Africa. If we
22 were unprepared for Africa, the Soviets were even more
23 unprepared. But they began to move into the African scene
24 early on. And we were very apprehensive about it. In retrospect
25 they could have been much less apprehensive about it. But

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1 there was no way in the world that we could have told at that
2 point. But I would make the point, and I stick to it, that
3 the early fears were compounded of both the Soviet Union's
4 thing as well as the dissolution of the Congo State and the
5 effect it would have on African Africa.

6 Ms. Pitts. My concern with it is that it seems as if there
7 weren't any Soviet Influence whatsoever, we still would have
8 been concerned with the Congo, and would probably have taken
9 the political action that was taken to fund the Binza Group,
10 and so on.

11 Mr. Tweedy. I guess, Ms. Pitts, that would be fair. It
12 is kind of difficult to tell at this point.

13 Ms. Pitts. Right, because you can't speculate on something
14 that didn't happen. But it was a very important area in
15 Africa potentially. That was the thing, both in terms of
16 the acreage it covered, the strategic materials it contained,
17 and its potential for harm or good in terms of its relatively
18 orderly development or chaotic dissolution.

19 Ms. Pitts. I think it makes much more sense to have a
20 multi-reason policy for taking covert action in an area,
21 and I have just been sort of dismayed at the insistence at
22 the hands of the Soviets.

23 Mr. Tweedy. My own conviction is that it was both.

24 Ms. Pitts. That seems reasonable.

25 Mr. Tweedy. But I would not disagree that obviously the

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1 Soviet thing in the long haul was the most important.

2 Ms. Pitts. Were relationships developed with those various
3 moderate Congolese politicians who, after independence,
4 became the recipients of political funding and that kind of
5 thing?

6 Mr. Tweedy. I think the first Station Chief -- the previous
7 Station Chief, whose name I have forgotten?

8 Ms. Pitts. Was it Mr. Devlin?

9 Mr. Tweedy. No.

10 Ms. Pitts. Before Mr. Devlin?

11 Mr. Tweedy. No, he was married to a nice Pan Am hostess,
12 and he was raising a huge family, I think he ended up with
13 about seven children. He had already made some tentative
14 contacts with some of the African leaders before independence.
15 But it was a very difficult thing to do when the Belgians were
16 in charge, you had to be very discrete. But basically all
17 those contacts were made later.

18 Ms. Pitts. It seems that the strong man, as various
19 people have named him, was clearly Mobutu from the beginning.

20 Mr. Tweedy. Once he got on the scene this young man did a
21 remarkable job of establishing himself and hanging onto it.
22 And even though there are times today when he looks to be a
23 bit of an ass, it has been a considerable career. I knew him
24 somewhat well. He and his wife had dined with me in my house
25 in Chevy Chase back in about 1962, I suppose it was. The

country without any question, has been much better off as a result of him than it might have been otherwise. And now, of course, he is becoming sort of an end of the 20th Century African, because I think the political urgency is called for. But I don't think it is anything that we should get very panicky about.

Ms. Pitts. It seems that a secondary goal in the Congo, the primary goal that Congo be unified and that it be politically and militarily stable, the secondary goal is that it is possible that the kind of Government that would come to be would be a democratic government, whatever that means, an elected government, represented by a parliament or whatever, and we have a policy, it seems that the State Department would levy requirements, do this, but make sure that it keeps the prime minister in the position he is, and that kind of thing. In other words, we were allowed to fund Mobutu, but it should be made clear to him that he should seek a secondary role to the elected politicians and that kind of thing. Do you agree that that would be sort of a secondary goal?

Mr. Tweedy. I have a hard time really remembering that. Obviously the State Department didn't want to upset the very delicate democratic balance -- let's use that word, because there isn't another, that is being realistic about it. We weren't interested in building up a one man dictatorship.

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1 And Mobutu was obviously sensible enough to realize that this
2 wasn't a sensible way to go about it either, even though you
3 can say that he has virtually reached that point now, or is
4 very close to it, and even though I guess the parliamentary
5 trappings are still there.

6 Ms. Pitts. Would you agree that it was a goal at all to
7 try to have a democratic government?

8 Mr. Tweedy. I think those of us who are very much
9 involved in Africa soon became a bit realistic on democracy
10 as such. What we were much more looking for was stability
11 commensurate without one man rule, but as the years went by,
12 it was perfectly obvious that there was no way you could
13 legislate this kind of thing, because in the early days of
14 primitive country's development, the leaders are inevitably
15 coming to the fore. What country in Africa can you think of
16 today where a man hasn't been of just enormous importance to
17 development of that country? Some of them survive. Houphuet,
18 Obignynseng and some others, Sengh of Senegal, still survive.
19 And they came there before Tweedy became Division Chief, and
20 they still survive.

21 Now, it may not be a one man dictator organization. They
22 are not.

23 Ms. Pitts. But one strong man who pretty much is the only
24 person capable of handling the country?

25 Mr. Tweedy. Ahidjo in the Cameroon.

1 Ms. Pitts. So I would say among the people who worked
2 with Africa there was no lip service to always trying to
3 encourage the formation of leadership by electoral mechanisms
4 and that kind of thing?.

5 Mr. Tweedy. I think we were realistic about it.

6 Ms. Pitts. I am not saying that that would have been
7 desirable at all.

8 Mr. Tweedy. I don't say that -- we certainly didn't try
9 to undermine it. But I think we and the State Department were
10 terribly realistic about it.

11 Ms. Pitts. Would you say that the State Department was
12 more interested in that kind of thing than the CIA would have
13 been?

14 Mr. Tweedy. I don't think you can differentiate the two.
15 Our jobs were different. We didn't disagree with what the
16 State Department wanted for Africa. Sometimes we could
17 disagree over detail, not so much what was wanted but what
18 was practical and what could be done and what was likely to
19 develop, our assessments of situations quite often varied.
20 But that happens all over the world. And sometimes they were
21 right and sometimes we were right. But I don't think this was
22 a philosophic split at all.

23 Ms. Pitts. I would like to ask you a little bit about
24 what we actually did down there, my primary interest is the
25 introduction of the pilots and so on in 1963. And if I may

1 say so, it seems that though one really had no idea what their
2 ultimate outs would be at the time that they were sent down
3 there.

4 Mr. Tweedy. You are absolutely right.

5 Ms. Pitts. And I am wondering if at that time there was
6 any indication that the military instability to rock the country,
7 if you will, in 1960, would ever be coming?

8 Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think probably our concern was, we
9 were after all under a mandate from the Government to keep this
10 situation shored up.

11 Ms. Pitts. To keep the US involvement very low key?

12 I don't understand.

13 Mr. Tweedy. What I meant was to make sure that once
14 again the Congo situation didn't fall apart. By this
15 time I am prepared to say, support the Mobutu government. Now,
16 it was quite unpredictable at that point what would be required.
17 One thing that was perfectly clear was that if we were going to
18 have to act in a military situation fast -- and I think we were
19 probably clear that if we ever had to act at all there
20 wouldn't be all that much lead time -- it would be much too
21 late to do anything about it. And thus I think you are quite
22 right in saying that when the pilots first of all got out there,
23 their mission was uncleared, they were there as a contingency
24 resources.

25 Ms. Pitts. They were brought in apparently at the request

1 over the initiative of the field as more of a psychological
2 kind of operation to fly the planes around?

3 Mr. Tweedy. If that is the way the record emerges I
4 wouldn't be surprised. You know we encouraged Mobutu and
5 stiffened his spine. I expect that was true.

6 Ms. Pitts. But it seems as if we weren't really prepared
7 to take on or to provide a combat capability, but as soon as
8 some of the makings of a combat capability, that is, pilots
9 to fly some little planes, were down there, Mobutu immediately
10 began to press for military support. It seems shortsighted,
11 is what I am saying, without leaning too much on the benefits
12 of looking back, to have procided the makings of a combat
13 capability without the intention of using it or becoming that
14 deeply involved.

15 Mr. Tweedy. You know, if you want to examine those things
16 in hindsight, all I can do is nod my hoary head and say,
17 perhaps you are right. But somebody, I guess, is in the
18 process of raising hell about Chile. All I am telling you is,
19 in 1967, when the Government was looking at the possibility
20 of a Marxist Government being freely elected south of the
21 border in Latin America, there was a large element of the US
22 Government that had the shivers. And there is no point in 1975
23 in saying they were all bloody well wrong. Maybe they were.
24 But that is the way we frail human beings are. And when you
25 have the security of the country as your responsibility --

1 and I am not talking about the Agency, I am talking about the
2 Government -- you are apt to run scared. And that is the way
3 life is. But to say that we did all the right things and
4 never made a mistake in those matters, or misassessed things,
5 would be nonsense. And Africa was an area where misassess-
6 ment was very easy to make. But I don't feel very shy about
7 it.

8 Ms. Pitts. There is no reason why you should.

9 Mr. Tweedy. This is the way it was. And it is very,
10 very difficult -- it is even difficult for me now in 1975 to
11 put myself back in the situation we were in in 1959. But that
12 clearly was the situation we were in. And we weren't doing
13 it just for fun and games.

14 Ms. Pitts. I don't think at any time I have indicated
15 that I thought the reasons were inadequate.

16 Mr. Tweedy. But you see, this is the thing. You said,
17 in retrospect it seems too bad.

18 Ms. Pitts. No, what I am taking issue with is whether
19 the US was able or attempted or considered the relevant
20 criteris to look ahead or try to look ahead in a given area
21 and set limits on how far it would be willing to become
22 involved along the line.

23 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it did.

24 Ms. Pitts. And it concerns me, and it concerns the
25 Committee, I think, given the continued capability to a

1 covert action in the area, that those kinds of criteria can
2 be taken into account. I suspect in the Congo, or it seems
3 very obvious, that the situation was so moment to moment,
4 our experience there was very short term, and so on, that
5 there wasn't any ability to look forward like that, and no
6 time.

7 Mr. Tweedy. That in effect is what I tried to say, that
8 some of these assets were put together as contingency assets,
9 for the simple reason that we knew that if certain types of
10 situations developed there was no way that we could press
11 buttons and have instant resources and responses to our
12 needs.

13 Ms. Pitts. And this would have been the kind of thinking
14 about the project that was being developed while you were
15 the Division Chief also to maybe provide a mobile gendarme
16 group?

17 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I do remember that now, since you
18 mentioned it. I had forgotten it.

19 Ms. Pitts. And it would have been a similar kind of
20 thing, not knowing what might happen, that we wanted to
21 support this Government?

22 Mr. Tweedy. That is right.

23 Ms. Pitts. And had to be ready.

24 Mr. Tweedy. That is right.

25 Ms. Pitts. I am wondering if you remember if the air team

1 was used in combat at all before the termination, if you can
2 call it that, of the Katanga secession? They get involved
3 in that?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Quite honestly, I don't have any idea. The
5 record will certainly show whether it did or not. I do not
6 remember basically any guns being fired in anger except by
7 the pilots. But that is my recollection. I don't think it
8 had happened before I left. I don't know how much I heard
9 about it afterward. I don't recall that those people were
10 ever sent into combat. But I am not saying they weren't.
11 I just don't know.

12 Ms. Pitts. Would you categorize this operation as very,
13 very small scale, and so on?

14 Mr. Tweedy. It is the biggest one I had ever been
15 involved in. But I hadn't been involved in any before. If
16 you want to compare it to other paramilitary activities,
17 obviously it was very small. We hadn't been engaged in all
18 that paramilitary activity. If you want to look around the
19 globe, it is obviously on a very small scale.

20 Ms. Pitts. Apparently after the termination of the Katanga
21 secession in 1963 everybody had to think about what they
22 wanted to do with this air team. And it seems as if -- and
23 I would like to know if this seems right in your memory -- that
24 the CIA was not anxious at all to retain a responsibility
25 over this pilot capability, and they certainly didn't want

1 to be the air force in the Congo, and so on. And in light of
2 that, the sponsorship, other sponsorship, non-CIA sponsorship
3 to the air program was sought?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Air sponsorship --

5 Ms. Pitts. Sponsorship for the air program, other than
6 the CIA. And even in some cases, I think, considering the
7 alternative side, the sponsorship external to the US. And
8 what ultimately happened, according to the record is, no one
9 else was willing to take on the responsibility, all the
10 options dried up and the CIA was stuck with --

11 Mr. Tweedy. Stuck with the baby.

12 Ms. Pitts. Yes. And if this is true I think it is
13 important, because I think that there is a misassumption that
14 the CIA is always anxious to get involved in these covert
15 operations. And most people I talked to seem to view it as
16 a method of last resort. It is always less desirable to do
17 something covertly if one can do it overtly.

18 Mr. Tweedy. I think that is fair enough. And I don't
19 think our Division Chief, when the question of dissolution
20 of the pilots came up --

21 Ms. Pitts. Were you the Division Chief until September
22 1963?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

24 Ms. Pitts. This was going on -- the consideration of
25 the sponsorship of the air program was being considered in

1 the spring --

2 Mr. Tweedy. Spring of 1963?

3 Ms. Pitts. And it was resolved in April of 1963.

4 Mr. Tweedy. April of 1963?

5 Ms. Pitts. Yes -- that the CIA would continue to fund
6 it and a separate project was set up for it.

7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

8 Ms. Pitts. And I think it had been funded --

9 Mr. Tweedy. Were the pilots out of the Congo by then?

10 Ms. Pitts. No, they stayed the whole time, they didn't
11 run.

12 Mr. Tweedy. That is what I meant. They stayed.

13 Ms. Pitts. And I am not sure if they were used. I think
14 they continued to train, because there was obviously a need
15 for a policy decision --

16 Mr. Tweedy. I think they were used after I left the
17 Division, but there is the vaguest possible recollection in
18 my mind.

19 Ms. Pitts. Yes, they were. But in this period of time
20 in 1963 when, one, there wasn't the Katanga secession
21 necessitating their use, but you weren't sure if you wanted,
22 I think, to get rid of this capability. And there was sort
23 of a long delay, as the options were tried out. And I guess
24 one option was -- or one alternative of the CIA sponsorship
25 that was tried -- was that the US AID would provide the

1 funding to the Government of the Congo, and the Government of
2 the Congo would then be able to hire the pilots on their own,
3 and that kind of thing, and would get us out of the covert
4 area altogether. And apparently Harlan Cleveland was an
5 advocate of this position. And I am wondering if you remember
6 why their attempt --

7 Mr. Tweedy. Was he at that time the Assistant Secretary
8 of State for International Organization Affairs?

9 Ms. Pitts. Yes. I am wondering if you recall why this
10 alternative of overt US Government sponsorship through AID
11 for the air program was not a viable one?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I can't recall.

13 Ms. Pitts. Do you remember these options being
14 considered?

15 Mr. Tweedy. I can't.

16 Ms. Pitts. That is understandable.

17 Mr. Tweedy. I really don't. I suspect one of the reasons
18 was that somehow this didn't really meet normal AID criteria.

19 Ms. Pitts. I have a question that has to do with the
20 Congo today. And that is, what do you think the consequence
21 of the publication of US involvement with Mobutu from his
22 early years would be today? Do you think it would discredit
23 him immeasurably in the African community or anything like
24 that?

25 Mr. Tweedy. I think it might indeed. I think it would

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1 be irresponsible to publish it, I really do. A Chief of State?
2 He was never our agent. I have made that point under oath.
3 We had very close relationships with him, and not only just
4 us, a series of ambassadors have had very close relationships
5 with him. Clare Timberlake in the early days was a first
6 class Ambassador, and Mobutu thought the world of him. But
7 to stress at this point this kind of relationship, if I may
8 say so, is the sort of silly thing that the US shouldn't be
9 doing. It just doesn't make any sense. I don't know what the
10 consequences would be for him personally, but there are a lot
11 of other things involved. There are a lot of Americans that
12 live in the Congo. And his political directions could well
13 be affected by this. You can't put a crystal ball on what
14 the results would be. But to say it quite flatly, I think
15 it is a breach of faith.

16 Ms. Pitts. You mean a breach of Mobutu's faith in the
17 US?

18 Mr. Tweedy. I mean in the relationship that we had with
19 him over the years irrespective of what it may be today.
20 Obviously it is quite different today from what it was in
21 1960. And I think it would be the height of irresponsibility.
22 And I see no excuse for it -- which is one of the reasons
23 why basically things like government files and foreign policy,
24 this's and that's, are not published until after a certain
25 statute of limitations runs out. This is the sort of basic

1 philosophy which is what I call normal, well ordered, human,
2 responsible, human relations.

3 Ms. Pitts. I appreciate your opinion.

4 Mr. Tweedy. I hold it very strongly.

5 Ms. Pitts. Thank you for your time.

6 Mr. Tweedy. That is fine.

7 Ms. Pitts. Off the record.

8 (Off the record discussion.)

9 Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Tweedy, what I would like to ask you
10 about if possible is the operational use of drugs by the
11 Agency, either proposed use or actual use. Let me try to
12 outline for you the state of the evidence at this point.

13 Apparently drugs, including LSD and Meretran, were used
14 relatively frequently for interrogation purposes throughout
15 the fifties and into the sixties. In 1957 and 1958 the
16 Agency began, under the auspices of Mr. Helms, who was at
17 that time Chief of Operations in DDP, an analysis of policies
18 and procedures to be used in regard to drugs. And what we
19 were most interested in is that the policies and procedures
20 that were set up to govern proposals in the DDP for such use,
21 and operational use that flowed from that. I have with me a
22 series of memos that were done at that time on policies and
23 procedures, and one case that mentions a particular use that
24 does not involve the African Division, but which raised some
25 questions that we might discuss. And if you would like to

1 look over the memos --

2 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, because at the moment I have the
3 hardest time remembering them.

4 Of course at that point I was in London.

5 Mr. Maxwell. There is no indication that you were
6 involved.

7 Mr. Tweedy. Of course I may not even have seen the memo.

8 Mr. Maxwell. You were in London from when to when?

9 Mr. Tweedy. 1956 to 1959.

10 Mr. Maxwell. And you came back to Head the Africa
11 Division?

12 Mr. Tweedy. I did.

13 Mr. Maxwell. The only reason for looking at those is
14 that they may in fact refresh your recollection as to the
15 discussions that were going on in the Agency, or that you
16 might have become aware of.

17 Mr. Tweedy. Sitting in London, a non-operational
18 station, strictly, it would be just the sort of thing that
19 would go right over the top of our heads and we would never
20 hear about. For example, I think I would be almost willing
21 to swear that I have never seen this memorandum. And it has
22 got some very interesting stuff in it here from the viewpoint
23 of the Medical Staff and so forth.

24 Mr. Maxwell. That is quite likely. The routing slips
25 would not reflect those materials?

1 Mr. Tweedy. They wouldn't have gone to a station like
2 mine, they might have gone to some station, but not one like
3 mine.

4 Mr. Maxwell. I think those internal policy papers
5 probably went to no stations.

6 Mr. Tweedy. That is very possible, because what the
7 case was, the divisions would have been instructed, and in
8 terms of their normal discipline over stations they would
9 have controlled the use that way without, as it were, involv-
10 ing the stations in the bureaucracy of memoranda of this
11 kind, which, among other things, might be considered overly
12 sensitive to repose in the station.

13 Mr. Maxwell. But the last memorandum, which is a
14 memorandum in draft form for the Chief of Operations on the
15 subject of the operational use of chemical agents, proposed
16 a committee which would pass on the use of drugs and also
17 proposed that anycables coming in from stations which
18 concerned proposals for such use be routed to this committee.

19 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure I have never seen this draft.

20 Mr. Maxwell. Are you aware of any policy decision on the
21 part of the Agency to institute such a committee, and if so --

22 Mr. Tweedy. The Committee itself means nothing to me,
23 which merely means that iether I have totally forgotten it
24 or I never knew about the committee. It never occurred to
25 me at that stage of the Agency development, i.e., say, about

1 the time that I came back from London, that the use of drugs
2 was not under strict controls. But if you are asking me
3 whether I can resurrect the nature of those controls, either
4 by a committee or this memorandum or the rest of it, I just
5 don't recall.

6 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall what you would have done if
7 a proposal from a station in Africa came to you which involved
8 the use of drugs, chemical or biological agents?

9 Mr. Tweedy. It would have been quite routine. One
10 would have cleared it through DDP, or the thing would have
11 been discussed with the DDP. It would have just automatically
12 have happened. It never did result that I heard.

13 Mr. Maxwell. Did the DDP or the Chief of Operations?

14 Mr. Tweedy. His office would have been aware of it.

15 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any Agency regulations --
16 there were a series of regulations that existed from 1952
17 on and which were replaced by a regulation known as CSI 220-10
18 governing what were called MK DELTA materials.

19 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure I saw those, I can't recall them
20 now, but I am sure I saw them. I tell you, as so many things
21 were in the Agency, which were governed by rules and the rest
22 of it, you didn't have to refer to the book to do things, it
23 automatically happened. Obviously if I was running the
24 Africa Division or the Eastern European Division and something
25 like this came up, I didn't have a pile of those things in

1 safe and just say, go ahead and do it. Even if I had been
2 so ignorant that I had just gone to TSD and said, how about
3 this -- the system at that point starts to work. Obviously
4 at that stage I wasn't ignorant. All I am saying is that I
5 don't remember. But discipline of this kind was just part of
6 the system. And it never occurred to me to go off half
7 cocked on my own. I didn't have the capability to do it.
8 The system wouldn't have permitted it. To do these things,
9 they have to be administered, you have to get access to them,
10 all this has to be done. And by that time the controls were
11 at work, even if I had been so ignorant a Division Chief
12 that wouldn't have gone through the proper procedures.

13 Mr. Maxwell. I understand that. That is part of what
14 we are trying to do in the absence of --

15 Mr. Tweedy. But it never came up anytime I was a Division
16 Chief in either of my two Division Chief jobs.

17 Mr. Maxwell. For the record, your second Division Chief
18 job was --

19 Mr. Tweedy. EE, Eastern Europe, which in effect was
20 Central and Eastern Europe, and Greece and Cyprus in those
21 days.

22 Mr. Maxwell. From when to when?

23 Mr. Tweedy. September 1963 to I think the first of June
24 1966.

25 Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any independent recollection

1 of a committee known as the Drug Committee?

2 Mr. Tweedy. No, I don't.

3 Mr. Maxwell. And this Committee would have consisted of
4 the Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence, a representative
5 from FI, a representative from TSD, a representative from the
6 Office of Security, and would have made recommendations to --

7 Mr. Tweedy. And a representative from Medical Staff?

8 Mr. Maxwell. That is not clear.

9 Mr. Tweedy. I merely noticed from that draft that this
10 was accommodated but I don't recall the Committee, no.

11 Mr. Maxwell. In a later occurrence, a proposal came
12 from the Acting Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division
13 for what was described as a "health alteration operation",
14 and was proposed -- and sought the approval for the "health
15 alteration committee" in 1960.

16 Mr. Tweedy. I never would have heard of it. Compartment-
17 tion on something like that just plain works, and I just
18 never would have heard of that.

19 Mr. Maxwell. Compartmentation -- perhaps you can explain
20 what you mean by compartmentation in this situation?

21 Mr. Tweedy. What I mean is, this was the business of the
22 Near East Division.

23 Mr. Maxwell. The Health Alteration Committee was not the
24 business of the Near East Division.

25 Mr. Tweedy. I thought you were raising with me the case

1 of this bloke, whoever he was, whose health was to be
2 altered.

3 Mr. Maxwell. No, I was raising the question only in
4 the context of --

5 Mr. Tweedy. I could not recall ever having heard of the
6 change of health committee, frankly. And I am rather diverted
7 by the name.

8 Mr. Maxwell. The Division was interested at the very
9 least in an institutional committee.

10 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. But I do not recall it. But I am
11 not at all saying that I never heard of it. I certainly
12 don't remember it. And probably the reason I don't recall it
13 is that I never in fact had any intercourse with it, is
14 probably the answer. Because I can only assume that it
15 wasn't active very often. And if it was active on behalf
16 of another Division, I wouldn't have heard of its workings,
17 obviously if it had been an operation which was business in
18 another Division I wouldn't have heard of it.

19 Mr. Maxwell. And you have no recollection of proposals
20 coming in for the operational use of drugs, chemicals or
21 biological agents which would be referred to it?

22 Mr. Tweedy. I have no recollection of that at all during
23 the time that I was Division Chief in Eastern Europe.

24 Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of any issuance
25 which came to you as Chief of the Africa Division which

1 indicated that cable traffic on this subject would be
2 referred to another body for consideration?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I don't have any recollection of it. But
4 there is no reason why the African Division should have been
5 immune to this, and I am sure I probably was in receipt of
6 the instruction, which must have been sent to all Division
7 Chiefs. But I can't remember it, that is all. But I am sure
8 I must have seen it if it was issued.

9 Mr. Maxwell. That is all that I had. And I appreciate
10 your cooperation.

11 Mr. Tweedy. I am sorry that I wasn't more helpful.

12 (Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the interview was concluded.)
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